Chapter IV
THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY IN SOCIAL POLICY

This Chapter considers the family in relation to welfare assistance. Integral to the Australian income maintenance system is the adoption of the family as the unit of income. Implicit in this process are a number of assumptions: firstly, that the family is the basic unit in this society; secondly, that families operate as a joint income unit in which there is an equitable distribution of income, and thirdly, that, as a result, dependent family members do not require welfare assistance.

In the Social Security system the unit of payment is the nuclear family, although individuals who live on their own are also paid. To understand why this is so it is necessary to recall the Australian welfare system grew out of the English experience: first, help was derived solely from the extended family network, then, from the parish. In Australia, the state governments and voluntary bodies were the source of assistance provided by the parish in England. Even after federation when the Commonwealth Government began its Age and Invalid Pension scheme, there was enshrined in the legislation a requirement that an applicant had to establish that his or her family was unable to support the pensioner.

The history of the "family wage" and of Child Endowment reflect the importance placed on the family unit in the development of social policy. The early debates surrounding these issues highlight the central place which the nuclear family assumed in the minds of the political and judicial elites.

When it comes to taxation policy different attitudes prevail. The Asprey Committee on Taxation held that:

The right to be taxed as an individual has always been accorded in Australia. At a time when women are playing an ever greater role in the economic and other affairs of society, the withdrawal of this right would certainly be regarded as a retrograde step. And objections would come not only from women: men too might take exception to a universal and compulsory commingling of their tax affairs with those of their wives. This would, in the Committee's view, make a change in this direction politically unacceptable irrespective of whether married women (or married men) paid more or less tax after the change than they do now: social attitudes to the separate status of the sexes, rather than purely economic considerations are involved here. (1).

The disjunction between attitudes to the family arising out of the relations of production and attitudes considered appropriate in regard to the relations of distribution are seldom acknowledged. This contradiction is maintained by similar mechanisms to those which create an occupational and fiscal welfare system for the rich and a far less helpful social welfare system for the poor described in Chapter III.

The choice of the family as the unit of payment for most welfare relief measures has a number of implications for economic dependency, intra family equity and the introduction of income guarantees. The following discussion is substantially centred around the issue of gender because feminist analysis has identified the extent to which gender and to a lesser extent age are
basic organising principles for the processes of distribution in Australian society and therefore for access to resources and to power. The dominant critiques of the role of dependency have developed out of feminist theory. Later in this Chapter I investigate the effect that the adoption of the nuclear family as the unit of payment has on rural Aboriginal people.

Many governmental family policies are predicated upon the belief that the stereotypical nuclear family is the predominant and most desirable family structure. This is in spite of the fact that Liberal-National Party or Labor Party Governments are aware of the presence in considerable numbers of household structures very different from the stereotypical nuclear family. The Family Services Committee's two volume Report and the five volume Report of the Human Relations Commission, presented in 1978 to the Australian Government, expend a considerable time describing alternative family structures.

In 1971, 30.5 per cent of the households in Australia consisted of a man, woman, and dependent children but by 1981 this proportion had decreased to 28.6 per cent: this decline was reflected in an increased number of households composed of single parents, unmarried people and married couples without children (2). In 1966 29 per cent of married women were in the workforce, by 1982 this percentage had increased to 42 per cent (3): 60 per cent of married women in their forties are now in employment (4).

Land, writing about the British experience but with considerable relevance to Australia, points out that the "typical family" presented in television commercials consisting of a man in full-time employment, a full-time housewife and two dependent children, constitutes only "about 10 per cent" of families in the United Kingdom (5).

Notwithstanding the existence of a variety of household forms, the nuclear family remains the ideal. the essential feature of family life would appear to be that it has the capacity to transform an individual in need into a person who is dependent on a spouse or a parent and is therefore no longer in need of help from the state.

I will first consider the family wage and Child Endowment before proceeding to look at some of the consequences which flow from the adoption of the family as the appropriate unit for social welfare payments.

The family wage

In the early part of this century in England and Australia it became apparent that because of the low rates of pay, a main cause of poverty in large families was the dependence by family members on the one wage. In Australia the union struggles to increase wages in the Arbitration Court led to the introduction of the "family wage". This "family wage" was intended to be sufficient to support a man, his wife, and three children.

The "family wage" sometimes referred to as the "basic wage", introduced nationally in Australia by the 1907 Harvester judgement has been both applauded and condemned. Markey states that the Harvester judgement grew out of trade union determination to establish a "living wage" and points to earlier judgements in state arbitration courts which incorporated the essential ingredients set down by Mr Justice Higgins: Markey sees the decision, at least in part, as resulting from support for the family (6). The introduction of the family wage in Australia clearly provided
the average man who was lucky enough to be in regular unionised employment with the "capacity" to support a wife and a small number of children. Such a policy could be implemented because the notion of a sexual division of labour (in terms of men's and women's jobs) was widely held. The Harvester judgement simply confirmed existing gender discrimination. It was to condemn the female workforce to a wage rate of approximately 54 per cent of the male rate for over 50 years. Baldock comments that "one of the most striking features of the Australian Labour market has been the deliberate maintenance of sex segregation" (7).

Seemingly unmindful of the impact on female wage earners, Dickey declared

"The 'living wage' became a benchmark for debate from that day to this; not only for wage fixation, but also for families fighting the grim battle against poverty. No other single decision of the 20th century in this field in Australia has done more than this creative judgement of Higgins to transform the lives of the whole sector of the community whose welfare in the 19th century had so often been a problem of selective charity."(8)

From the earliest in-depth analysis of the family wage from a feminist perspective, is that provided by Hilary Land who has looked at this issue in the English context (9). She makes the following points:

1. Though women also had dependent children their wage rates were not adjusted to account for this fact;

2. Half of all male workers over the age of twenty had no dependent children though one in six had three or more children;

3. The family wage made women dependent upon their husbands;

4. Providing men with the financial capacity to care for their entire family does not guarantee that they will do that in any equitable way;

5. One in six households (excluding pensioner households) were dependent upon a woman's income. (10)

Land's analysis would appear to have considerable application to the Australian situation. For example, Cass reports a study of women workers in Australia in 1928 which showed that 30 per cent were helping to support or totally supporting other family members (11). Whelan notes that at the time of the Harvester judgement, 45 per cent of male workers were single (12).

It was not until 1974 with the Commonwealth Arbitration Court's equal pay decision and the signing of two International Labour Conventions by the Whitlam government that the principle of equal wages for equal work was accepted at the national level. Even so, in 1978 the average female rate of pay was still only 76.5 per cent of the average male rate (13).

Children endowment/family allowances

Around the time of the implementation of family wage policy, child endowment had been suggested as an alternative way of avoiding family poverty. From the 1920s there was a body of women who wanted child endowment seen as a payment to mothers, and who wanted the issue of support for children separated from the concept of the family wage in order that the issue of wage
justice for women could be addressed. The suggestion was that the child endowment would be paid to the mother of children directly by the state rather than indirectly through the father's wage. Thirty-five years after the Harvester judgement, Child Endowment was introduced federally in Australia.

Since before its introduction Child Endowment has been embroiled in the wallet or the purse debate. Some male workers opposed its introduction because they saw it limiting the dependence of spouses and children on them. It was seen to undermine their role as the breadwinner. In Australia

"Conservative elites argued the case against child endowment on the basic premise that allowances to the mothers of dependent children would undermine the parents', and in particular the father's, obligation to maintain his own children." (14)

Such family allowances were opposed by the "aristocracy" of workers and by capital. Many in the trade union movement were concerned that they would be used in a Bismarckian fashion to lower wage demands and capitalists were concerned that they might sustain workers during strikes (15). There has been in the Australian context an intimate connection between limiting the industrial power of the organised working class and the payment of child endowment (16). The President of the New South Wales Industrial Tribunal, Piddington, in his capacity as chairperson of a royal commission into the basic wage "recommended that the basic wage no longer be determined on the basis of workers' needs, but instead on industries' capacity to pay"(17). Child Endowment (in New South Wales) was the direct result of his 1962 wages decision in which he discounted the costs of raising children. When the Menzies Government introduced Child Endowment in 1941 it did so under remarkably similar circumstances (18). Bettina Cass has summarised the conflictual nature of this debate in Australia: she makes the point that "child endowment was seen by labour as an addition to the living wage but used by employers and political/judicial elites as a replacement of the child maintenance component of the living wage in order to legitimate wage restraint."(19)

In any case, endowment payments have been paid at a low level and have been eroded by inflation since their introduction. As a result they do not at present constitute a real alternative method for ending family poverty (20).

Confronted by the fact that the major single cause of poverty at the turn of this century was the low wages received by working people with large families, the powerful sections of the trade union leadership (which was then, as now, preoccupied with male employment) organised to increase the level of wages of the membership. Part of the argument used was that a man should be able to provide for his entire family. The introduction of the family wage did not assist the entire working class - it advantaged the single male worker without dependents, encouraged the dependence of wives on their husbands, and substantially disadvantaged women workers, all the more so if they were sole providers for their families. Because it unnecessarily divided the working class against itself it acted against the overall interests of the working class. This was poorly recognised by the bulk of the working class.

The essential justification (21) for the payment of a "family component" relied on the established need of those other family members dependent upon the wage of the breadwinner. The Australian Arbitration system, in coming to terms with the needs of "dependants", made the assumption that dependency equated closely with being a woman or a child. In its deliberations it ignored all other forms of dependency which might occur within extended households. Part of the issue of dependency, that of children, was addressed by the introduction of Child Endowment but
as Cass has shown there was an intimate connection between Child Endowment and limitations of wages. (should there be a footnote here?)

The strength of the support for the nuclear family derives in part out of views about motherhood (22). There is a commonly held belief that the woman's place is in the home, and for her to be elsewhere is alleged to inflict psychic trauma on the children. Lynn Townsend has written "The whole ideology of 'maternal deprivation' which isolates women with their small children for several years at a time is a powerful instrument in inducing isolation and depression in women."(23)

Whilst women physically reproduce, it is men who control the processes of social reproduction and its social meaning. This is done, partially at least, by excluding women from the paid workforce which would given them economic independence: keeping them at home enforces women's economic dependence on men.

**Current welfare practice in relation to families**

Ministers of Social Security have placed much importance on support for the family (24) in their explanation of the basis of the income maintenance structure, yet politicians also insist on the importance of the individual, and on his or her rights and obligations in society. This contradiction is embedded in the Social Security system.

Eligibility for all Social Security payments but blind pensions and, until 1987, Family Allowances have two components. Firstly the individual applying must establish an eligibility as an individual. In the case of Supporting Parents Benefit and Widows Pension that eligibility is dependent on the presence of children in the care of that individual. (These payments were amalgamated in the 1988 budget). Having established that the individual fits into the eligibility category the Department of Social Security then needs to satisfy itself that the applicant's nuclear family's income is within the level allowed.

Take, for example, the case of a man and his wife who both have worked for fifteen years; his income may be twice that of his wife, and the Taxation Department would have taxed her at a lower rate and him at a higher rate of taxation. These people are not allowed to pool their income and pay as a result, less overall tax. If he becomes unemployed, the Department of Social Security would decide that as an individual he meets the other than financial eligibility requirements to receive Unemployment Benefit. The Department then pools this man's and his wife's income in their calculation of means test thus precluding him from receiving any payment from the Department.

These dual eligibility requirements raise a number of questions. Did this situation arise because the enforced dependence on another person - the spouse - was seen as a method of reinforcing the sanctity and/or importance of marriage or of the family as a unit? Is there an assumption that somehow it is less marriage sustaining to provide someone with an independent income, albeit small and unearned, than to have her or him dependent on her or his spouse? Is it just that it requires less expenditure by the state? Is it because, at least until recently, this test of the financial means of the nuclear family mainly operated against the independence of women and so was in the interests of working class male chauvinism and of the overall interests of patriarchy?

Only the most dogmatic would hold that the state's paying of a benefit to an unemployed spouse would weaken the marriage bonds. The evidence which is available shows that marriage
break-up amongst the unemployed is substantially more frequent than is the case for the employed (25). Anything which decreases the financial pressures on the families of the unemployed increases the feelings of certainty and security and would be likely to help sustain marriage. It is mainly women who are discriminated against by the provision that spouses of the employed are not paid Unemployment Benefit. It is likely that the neglect of this issue was facilitated by the prevailing gender outlook of powerful sections of the trade union movement. But the major obstacle to payment of unemployed spouses is one of costs. Once employed workers' spouses who were able to meet the eligibility conditions applying to Unemployment Benefit were paid, this would substantially increase the pressure to pay allowances to those spouses who did not want to work.

These are just some of the intricacies which flow from the insistence that the family be adopted as the unit for welfare payments.

Another complicating feature of this aspect of the income maintenance system is the fact that gradually over the years non-working wives and more recently even common law wives of recipients of pensions and benefits have been paid a wife's allowance. This was done to recognise the family responsibilities of recipients. This payment has had the effect of helping to "justify" the adoption of the nuclear family as the unit of payment for Social Security.

Prior to 1963 married pensioners living together both received a pension in their own right but in that year it was decided to strike a lower rate for married people than would apply were they to live independently. At the time of its introduction the government argued that because there were savings which accrued to couples living together they should not get double what a single pensioner received. This is an argument based on very narrow equity considerations and provides a financial disincentive to the continuance of marriage*.

The principle that men and women who lived together should receive less than two single pensioners was not extended to same sex pensioners sharing accommodation and cooking - as would be demanded by broader equity considerations - nor was there any attempt to extend the reasoning to relatives, such as brother and sister living in the same house or to homosexual couples. Associated with this equity argument was a suggestion that any savings accrued from the lowering of pension rates to married couples would be used for the benefit of the more "needy" single pensioner.

If need was the issue then similar ends could have been arrived at simply by increasing the base rate of single pensions to a point where the single pensioner could adequately maintain him or her self.

Anyone wishing to argue that need was the overriding consideration in the Australian social welfare system would have to explain why prior to 1973 many female supporting parents (1977 for male supporting parents) were not paid a Commonwealth benefit but had to rely on state government assistance. This assistance was usually less financially rewarding than Federal payments and the administrators of such payments were more invasive of

* Pensioners renting in Sydney on the private market, compared with pensioners who are able to get housing commission rebated rental or who own their own home, would be likely to have greater differentials in spending power than occurs between single and married pensioners.
privacy than their Commonwealth counterparts (26). In the 1970s when the Commonwealth, slowly and reluctantly, entered this field it did so first by paying Special Benefit (hardship) to predominantly female supporting parents. This benefit was paid at a rate considerably less than that applying in the case of Widows Pension.

The Department of Social Security had until 1973-77 refused to recognise common law relationships and the children which resulted from them as children of a marriage in situations where the relationship had broken down. It would not pay for children born to Widow Pensioners more than 9 months after the death of the husband. At the same time it would, in cases where the Widow Pensioner had income apart from the pension, calculate the extra income allowable without reduction on an equal basis for "children of the marriage" and "children not of the marriage".

The Department on the other hand accepted that children, other than those of the husband, whether born within the blissful state of holy matrimony or otherwise, if they had been treated a dependants by the husband - were "children of the marriage". When the Department was informed of the presence of a non-relative male in the house of a Widow Pensioner it insisted that the woman establish that the relationship was not a "bona-fide domestic relationship".

The term "bona-fide domestic relationship" has within Departmental circles been regularly redefined and recent Administrative Appeal Tribunal hearings have substantially changed the meaning the Department had applied to it. Many Departmental officers throughout the 1970s and even into the 1980s considered "bonafide domestic relationship" to be a relationship between two people of the opposite sex where there is some combining of income and or services, such as washing of clothes - it presumes a sexual relationship but does not insist that a sexual component is part of the arrangement (27).

At the very time when the Department refused to accept that common law marriages were marriages within the meaning of the Act, the mere presence of a man in a Widow Pensioner's home could result in her having her pension stopped because it was presumed that she became the responsibility of that man. Neither equality nor equity are a sufficient explanation of the reasoning behind the implementation of the Social Security Act in respect to such arrangements.

The Department of Social Security claimed the guiding principle was to ensure that married people were not disadvantaged compared with non-married persons. In relation to the children born outside of wedlock in situations where the breadwinner of the home disappeared, it could be accused of having applied the principle unmercifully (28).

There are examples of instances where such income maintenance policies provide incentives to the break up of marriage. Clearly, only certain types of families are intended to be supported. The majority of pensioners are aged and, as has been shown, the pension structure provides financial disincentives to living together. This is an example of institutionalised ageism within the welfare system. A confounding factor is that the greater need of single people is used to justify the lower rate for married pensioners.

As noted at the very beginning of this section, the importance of the family in social policy sprang in the first instance from the fact that prior to parish or state run welfare services, the kinship network was the only form of help on which persons in need could call. The state still expects some family members to be maintained by relatives. In the introduction to the Poverty Inquiry report Professor Henderson writes "When we ask ourselves 'How do most individuals receive help and support?', the answer surely is: 'from their families, friends and neighbours.'" (29)
One of the myths which has sprung up about families is that in most families, if not all, there is an equitable sharing of wealth: or at least everybody receives sufficient provided there is something for all to share. This amounts to a form of trickle-down economics. It was always at best an assumption. No real attempt was ever made to verify it. It provided a very comfortable belief for those who argued the importance of maintaining family structures.

In 1975, the Australian Government's Taxation Review Committee, headed by Mr Justice Asprey, found that a high degree of sharing "is by no means universal. In some marriages, and not by any means only unhappy ones, almost completely separate patterns of spending and enjoyment may be the rule."(30) Later work by Meredith Edwards clearly established the inequitable nature of many intra family transfers; she has done more than any other Australian to end the myth that providing funds to one family member ensures that all family members are adequately looked after (31).

Whilst governments maintain the myth of the preponderance of the stereotypical nuclear family with its presumed equitable intra-family transfer of income they are protected from the necessity to address the reality of the frequent inequalities which are prevalent inside families. If government were to accept the presence of and the frequency of massive inequalities in intra-family income transfers they would be hard pressed to justify the basing of income maintenance policy on the presumption that all members of a family will be looked after if one member of a family receives sufficient income to allow him or her to provide for all. They would be forced to recognise that if equity or equality was the intended goal of social welfare policy, even if limited to equal treatment of the poor, then it would be necessary to create policy around individual equity rather than persevere with the myth that providing money to one member of a family will result in equitable treatment for all family members.

Whilst governments can maintain the pretence that intra-family transfers are equitable or at least not the business of government, they are protected from the need to account for the lack of total cover in income maintenance policies. It allows governments to get away with the vague suggestion that the current package of welfare benefits when coupled with wages policies ensures there is a safety net below which no-one falls.

Much is made by Labor and Liberal Governments in Australia of their support for the family. The actual levels of assistance provided in many cases to families entirely dependent on the state is less than would be necessary to maintain the family's income above the poverty line (32).

**ABORIGINES: INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY ASSESSMENT.**

The dual eligibility test which Social Security applies to any applicant for benefit becomes more complicated when tribal Aboriginal people attempt to get a payment. One example is provided below:

The family live on an outstation 20 kilometres from an Aboriginal Community in which live 300 Aborigines and 80 whites. This community is the service centre of the outstations in a 100 kilometre radius; the community is 300 kilometres from the closest European township in which the Department of Social Security has a presence. The family consists of a man who has three wives (all tribally married): the first wife aged 47 does not have any dependent children, the second and third do. Let us assume the man dies.
In the past it would have been up to the determining officer to decide whether or not to accept the tribal marriage as "a marriage within the meaning of the Act", but sufficient precedents are now set for it to be assumed that tribal marriages would normally be accepted as marriages. The first wife presuming her assets were low enough could be granted a class C Widows Pension for six months, after which time she might be transferred to Unemployment Benefit. If she was invalid she might get an Invalid Pension, or if she was not actually living within the husband's household at the time of his death and was living in the single women's camp, she might be treated as not married and any benefit she might obtain would be a result of her "individual" status. If the first wife was accepted as a wife within the meaning of the Act, the second and third wives would most likely receive Supporting Parent Benefit. However, if the first wife was not considered to be a wife then the second wife would be seen as the wife - she would get Widows Pension Class A and the third wife would get Supporting Parent Benefit. By treating each wife differently, the Department unintentionally defines them as not being part of the same family. These provisions, whilst they are not contrary to the legislation and have become accepted by the administration, have been painfully evolved over the last 15 years generally at the expense of the Aboriginal community which has had to support its dependent members in situations where, had they been whites living in cities, something would have been done to find a solution much earlier.

In the example just given, I have described what would happen if everything operates well, but because the family lives 300 kilometres from the nearest Social Security Office, the family will be unlikely to apply for benefit until someone, either a nursing sister, outstation centre employee, or an Aboriginal liaison officer of the Department calls - the process could take some months. The level of knowledge about eligibility entitlements in rural Australia is very low because of the high levels of illiteracy (coupled with isolation). This is so despite efforts (such as audio tapes) made by the Department of Social Security to increase people's awareness.

The history of neglect of Aborigines by various Australian Governments is reflected in the history of the Department of Social Security. Until the 1970s the Social Service Act, as it was then called, specifically excluded nomadic Aborigines from its provision.

If we were to take this same family and suppose that instead of the man dying he became unemployed, then, providing Unemployment Benefit was being paid in his area, he could be paid that; his first wife would be paid wife's allowance; all dependent children would be entitled to a payment; but neither the second nor third wife, whilst they continued to live with the man, would have any entitlement. Were they to live separate from him they would, provided they had at least one child each in their care, get Supporting Parent Benefit. This is another example of how the Social Security provisions provide a financial incentive to the break-up of a family.

During the 1960s Aboriginal families coming off Aboriginal settlements and missions in Queensland and attempting to live in the white society, found they could not obtain full Social Security payments for Unemployment Benefit because the breadwinner's income (on the settlement) was taken as the base financial position. The Department would not pay anyone (irrespective of race) more money on Benefit than they had received before going onto Benefit - loss of income was an eligibility requirement. Nor would they take the entire family's income into account. They took only that of the breadwinner (usually male) even if both he and his wife worked on the settlement.

This ruling, whilst not of itself racist, resulted in discrimination primarily against Aborigines. In Queensland at this time state government legislation allowed the Department of Native Affairs to control the movement of Aborigines. This Department could force Aborigines to
live on a particular settlement (or mission) or could remove Aborigines from that settlement. On settlements run by the Queensland Government award rates were never paid to Aborigines. Non-Aborigines were covered by industrial awards irrespective of whether they worked on or off settlements.

CONCLUSION

The adoption of the family as the unit of payment has, in this Chapter, been shown to have a number of outcomes. It has institutionalised dependence relationships on the basis of gender and age. The rhetoric of those who have argued for the adoption or retention of the family as the unit of payment has centred around support for a particular form of family which feminists have called "the stereotypical nuclear family". The adoption of this form of family discriminates against more extended family systems as in the case of migrants and Aborigines, and also against single parent families and other household formations. The nuclear family was shown, in recent times, to be declining in numerical importance as other forms of family configurations have increased in number.

The implied dependence which is integral to the concept of the stereotypical nuclear family has been linked to the assumption of equitable distribution of income within families in the statements of those who promote the family as the unit of income.

This Chapter challenged those assumptions, arguing that in many situations the dependence was non-existent due, among other things, to the fact that many women worked and that in any case, the assertion that transfers were equitable did not establish their fairness.

This Chapter has strongly questioned the assumption that dependency within families equates automatically with being a wife or a child. Many women have been a if not the breadwinner in families and this is becoming more common.

The argument has been put that the major attraction which the adoption of the family as the unit of payment of income maintenance has for government is that it transforms an individual in need into a person who is dependent upon a spouse or a parent and therefore is no longer in need of support from the state.

The relevance of this Chapter lies in exposing the essential patriarchal assumptions which inform the choice of the family as the income unit.

The essential point of this Chapter to the thesis as a whole is to argue against the usefulness of the family as the unit of payment if the intention of the income maintenance system is to promote equity and to maximise opportunities for all. The only viable alternative to the family is to use the individual as the unit of payment as does the taxation system.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4


(3) loc. cit. (Impact)

(4) McDonald, P., "Can the family survive?" Australian Society, Vol 2, No 11, December 1983, p.5


(6) Markey, R., "The ALP and the emergence of a national social policy" in Kennedy, R. (ed) Australian Welfare History, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1982, pp 114-117. See also Macarthy, P., "Justice Higgins and the Harvester Judgement" in Roe, J. (ed) Social Policy in Australia, op. cit., who argues that rather than the actual cost of installation of a living wage it was issues such as the way the unions had formulated their wage claims (7 shillings a day rate) and the view which Higgins took with regard to "reputable" employers' wage policies which determined what the living wage would be.

(7) Baldock, C. "Public policies and the paid work of women", in Baldock, C., and Cass, B. (eds), op.cit., p.34

(8) Dickey, B. No Charity There, Nelson, Melbourne, 1983, p.125


(10) ibid.


(14) Cass, B. "Redistribution to children and to mothers", op.cit., p.64


(18) loc.cit. See also Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Income Maintenance Programs, Vol 11, Australian Government, Canberra, 1983, p.37


(21) Barrett, M. and McIntosh, M. The Anti-Social Family, Verso, London, 1982, p.8. One of the reasons the family wage concept found such ready acceptance is put forward by Barrett and McIntosh who alert us to the contradiction that "The stereotypical nuclear family accounts, roughly, for only a third of households in Britain today. Yet the media give the impression that the entire population is securely bound up in it."

(22) Wearing, B. The Ideology of Motherhood, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984
The popularity of Bowlby's book Child Care and the Growth of Love and its many imitators resulted from and lent tenuous 'academic' support to the ideological pronouncement that the woman's place is in the home. Patricia Morgan, in Child Care Sense and Fable demolishes the research design and procedures which Bowlby used to support his conclusions about maternal deprivation, yet her book, published in 1975, is long out of print, Bowlby's book published in 1953, remains on the Penguin lists.


Taped discussion with Senator Fred Chaney, December 1982, in author's possession.

Ternowetsky, G. Intergenerational Poverty Life Styles and Income Maintenance, op.cit. pp.30-33


This perspective has been revealed in many Administrative Appeal Tribunal Hearings.


Henderson, R. Poverty in Australia (Main Report) op.cit. p.5.


Edwards, M. "Financial arrangements within families", Social Security, December 1981. See also Chapter VI of this thesis in the section dealing with unit of payment.

See Institute of Family Studies, Changing the Australian Taxation System Towards a Family Income Guarantee, Institute of Family, Melbourne, 1985